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Tracking individual workers across jobs after Brazil’s trade liberalization in the 1990s shows that tariff
cuts trigger worker displacements, but neither exporters nor comparative-advantage sectors absorb
trade-displaced labor. On the contrary, exporters separate from significantly more and hire fewer workers
than the average employer. Trade liberalization increases transitions to services, unemployment, and
out of the labor force. Results are consistent with faster labor productivity growth than sales expansions
so that output shifts to more productive firms while labor does not. Higher rates of failed reallocations
and longer durations of complete reallocations result, associated with a costly incidence of idle resources.
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Economists have long studied the consequences of foreign trade for domestic markets. At the
heart of welfare gains from trade is the expansion of consumption possibilities and the realloca-
tion of production factors. Yet research to examine the impact of trade liberalization on workers’
individual employment trajectories across employers over time is scant. We use economy-wide
linked employer-employee data and investigate resource reallocation directly, by following work-
ers across employers and industries before and after a major trade reform in Brazil.
We ﬁnd that Brazil’s trade liberalization triggers worker displacements, particularly from more
protected industries, as trade theory predicts and welcomes. But neither exporting ﬁrms nor com-
parative-advantage industries absorb trade-displaced workers for several years. In fact, exporters
separate from signiﬁcantly more and hire signiﬁcantly fewer workers than the average employer
after trade liberalization. Trade also heightens transitions out of the formal manufacturing sector
and into services, unemployment, or out of the labor force. Idle resources result, which we observe
in higher rates of failed reallocations and longer durations of complete reallocations.
Theory predicts that more efﬁcient producers gain product-market shares as trade barriers fall
(Melitz 2003). Evidence on trade liberalization episodes conﬁrms this output reallocation (e.g.
Pavcnik 2002). Responding to trade opportunities, employers upgrade skills and technology (Ver-
hoogen 2008, Bustos 2011). In contrast, evidence on trade-induced labor reallocation is weak:
there is a lack of reallocation evidence in developing countries (for a survey see Goldberg and
Pavcnik 2007) and there is no detectable sectoral difference of trade exposure on displaced work-
ers in industrialized countries (see e.g. Kruse 1988, Kletzer 2001, for the United States). We ﬁnd
clear trade-related worker ﬂows. But more productive ﬁrms fail to expand employment after trade
liberalization so that sales shift to more productive ﬁrms while labor moves in the reverse direc-
tion or remains unallocated.1 Our results are consistent with rising efﬁciency at surviving ﬁrms
under heightened competition (as in Raith 2003, for instance) and with more productive ﬁrms that
1During the 1990s, labor reallocation and productivity change are negatively related throughout Latin America
(Pag´ es, Pierre and Scarpetta 2009). Brazil ranks around the world’s median in exports per capita: according to WTF
and WDI data for 2000, Brazil takes the 48th percentile in per-capita exports. As regards Brazil’s labor cost, Heckman
and Pag´ es (2004) estimate the expected value of total labor costs in Brazil to equal 50 months of pay, compared to an
OECD average of 42 months, and assess Brazilian social security contributions at 75 percent of total labor costs (40
months), compared to an average of 96 percent in OECD countries (38 months).






























































































































































































Sources: RAIS 1986-2001 (1-percent random sample), workers nationwide of any gender or age, separated from a
formal-sector job; not re-acceding into a formal-sector job within 48 months (left graph) or re-acceding into a formal-
sector job within 48 months (right graph). Product tariffs from Kume, Piani and Souza (2003), employment weighted
at N´ ıvel 50 sector level in 1988.
Figure 1: Tariffs and labor-market performance
expand output while employing fewer workers under Brazil’s below-unity elasticities of demand
(Asano and Fiuza 2003).2 Our estimates and simulations conﬁrm that a large part of the increase
in nonemployment during the early 1990s is attributable to trade liberalization.
This direct labor-market evidence offers a novel explanation why pro-competitive reforms can
be associated with strong efﬁciency gains at the employer and industry level but not in the ag-
gregate, where idle resources result. Figure 1 shows our two main measures of idleness in Brazil
during the 1990s and plots them against Brazil’s falling trade barriers. The share of displaced
workers with no reallocation for four years rises from below 18 percent before 1990 to 22 percent
by 1993. The duration of complete reallocations lasts nine months by 1993, up from six months
and less before 1990. Conservatively measured, the foregone annual wage bill from the increase
in reallocation durations and failures after 1990 amounts to between one and four percent of GDP.
To measure the effect of trade on employment trajectories, we combine administrative emplo-
yer-employee records that provide detailed demographic information on the universe of formally
employed workers with employer-level data on export status and labor productivity. The time hori-
zon of sixteen years from 1986 to 2001 allows us to measure idle resources for a long period. Use
2For a common class of open-economy models, it depends on the elasticity of demand whether a sector’s produc-
tivity increase results in an employment expansion (see e.g. Obstfeld and Rogoff 1996, ch. 4.3.2).
2ofworkerpaneldataiscrucial. Ourﬁndingsshowthatotherwiseunobservedworkercharacteristics
are important determinants of transitions and obscure the estimated impact of trade on labor market
transitions, if not controlled for. The link to individual employer data is necessary to document the
direction of worker ﬂows not just across sectors but within sectors, where most reallocations occur
(see also Levinsohn 1999). Our ﬁndings conﬁrm that employer characteristics interact signiﬁcantly
with trade exposure. The results are robust to sector effects, year effects and sector-speciﬁc trends,
and standard errors are estimated under simultaneous clustering at the worker and sector level. We
control for other concomitant economic changes, including macroeconomic stabilization, foreign
direct investment, privatization, service-job outsourcing, and a pre-trade reform of labor-market
regulations. We construct instrumental variables for tariffs and exports, using sectoral imports
from other source countries than Brazil in foreign destinations and foreign price components of
the sectoral real exchange rate. The instruments are strong predictors of export behavior and trade
policy, and address potential simultaneity between labor-market changes and trade.
Our paper is related to several strands of the literature. A number of industry-level studies use
measures of job creation, destruction, and churning (excess turnover beyond net change). Halti-
wanger, Kugler, Kugler, Micco and Pag´ es (2004), for instance, show for six Latin American coun-
tries that tariff reductions are associated with heightened within-sector churning and net employ-
ment reductions at the sector level. For trade liberalization episodes in a large sample of countries,
Wacziarg and Wallack (2004) fail to detect signiﬁcant employment shifts. Employer-level studies
show for several countries that trade reforms are associated with product market reallocation to-
wards more efﬁcient producers and employment reductions at producers that are adversely affected
by trade (see e.g. Treﬂer 2004, Verhoogen 2008).3 After trade reform in Brazil, employment con-
tracts at highly productive ﬁrms. Linked employer-employee data allow us to observe the resulting
incidence of idle resources and to estimate hirings separately from separations. The hiring margin
is critical because it determines the job ﬁnding rate, which regulates nonemployment.
Using labor surveys aggregated to the sector level, Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) report no
3In contrast, Currie and Harrison (1997) do not ﬁnd Moroccan ﬁrms to adjust employment after trade reform,
and Revenga (1997) reports that trade reform reduces employment at Mexican ﬁrms with no detectable cross-sectoral
reallocation. Using import penetration as predictor, Revenga (1992) detects signiﬁcant employment effects in U.S.
industries. Attheindividualworkerlevel, however, Kruse(1988)andKletzer(2001)showthattrajectoriesofdisplaced
U.S. workers are largely explained by differences in workforce characteristics across sectors and not by the sector’s
trade exposure.
3statistically signiﬁcant relation between informal work and trade in Brazil. Our estimates conﬁrm
this ﬁnding at the individual level, controlling for the worker’s employment history. We do ﬁnd,
however, that tariff reductions raise transitions to unemployment and out of the labor force.4 Amiti
and Konings (2007) and Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik and Topalova (2010) stress the role of
intermediate inputs for productivity change and the introduction of new products at the ﬁrm level.
In line with those results, we ﬁnd in several speciﬁcations that lower input tariffs raise worker
retentions—either because lower input costs alleviate competitive pressure or because they permit
the adoption of more efﬁcient production and additional products.
A number of theoretical papers examine implications of trade for labor market reallocation
under institutional frictions, extending the work of Davidson, Martin and Matusz (1988). In mod-
els by Kambourov (2009) and Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding (2010), for instance, the realloca-
tion of workers following trade liberalization depends on the country’s labor market institutions,
such as ﬁring costs and search frictions.5 For the United States, Artuc ¸, Chaudhuri and McLaren
(2010) show in structural estimation that sizable switching costs for individual workers between
job locations dampen mobility after trade shocks.6 Except for a differential impact of high-school
education on hirings, we do not ﬁnd Brazil’s trade reform to exert a signiﬁcant heterogeneous
effect on workers after controlling for employer characteristics. This underlines the importance
of ﬁrm-level responses. Cos ¸ar, Guner and Tybout (2011) model hiring and ﬁring frictions for
heterogeneous ﬁrms and structurally estimate an extended Melitz (2003) model for worker tran-
sitions using Colombian ﬁrm data. Their simulations suggest only a minor effect of Colombia’s
import tariff reduction on labor markets, however. This paper aims to complement those structural
approaches by estimating the impact of trade liberalization on workers’ observed employment tra-
jectories under few assumptions. We document salient employment responses to trade reform and
spells of nonemployment as a source of adjustment cost to trade reform.
4A related strand of the literature uses the spatial distribution of industries to study effects of trade liberalizations
on regional outcomes (Topalova 2010, Hasan, Mitra, Ranjan and Ahsand 2011) and cross-regional mobility (Aguayo-
Tellez, Muendler and Poole 2010, Kovak 2011).
5Davis and Harrigan (2011) and Egger and Kreickemeier (2009) derive related implications in trade models under
efﬁciency-wage and fair-wage compensation, respectively.
6Dix-Carneiro (2010) introduces transferrable human capital with differential returns across sectors and afﬁrms, in
structural estimation using Brazilian worker panel data, that individual switching costs matter more for labor-market
outcomes than foregone human capital returns. Cos ¸ar (2010), in contrast, calibrates a trade model to Brazilian data
under sector-speciﬁc human capital and search frictions and ﬁnds a larger role of human capital.
4The paper is organized in ﬁve more sections. The next Section 2 presents our data and reports
descriptive evidence on trade and labor reallocation. Section 3 analyzes worker separations and
accessions to identify sector and ﬁrm predictors that explain labor-market outcomes. Section 4
reports estimation of trade-related worker reallocations across sectors and work status transitions
from a household perspective. Section 5 conducts counterfactual simulations based on a law of
motion that generates the relevant labor reallocation. Section 6 concludes.
2 Labor Reallocation, Productivity and Trade
Labor reallocation is the reassignment of workers to jobs across employers and sectors. Our con-
cern is with potentially idle labor: displaced workers who await formal-sector reallocation. We
track Brazil’s labor reallocation with two main data sets for workers of any age and gender. First,
we construct data on the basis of Brazil’s comprehensive linked employer-employee records for
the 16-year time span from 1986 through 2001. Linked employer-employee records document two
margins that change the pool of workers to be reallocated: separations from formal jobs that ﬁll the
nonemployment pool, and accessions into formal jobs that empty the nonemployment pool. Sec-
ond, we use household data (without employer information) to obtain information on transitions
into detailed types of work status outside formal employment.
Data. Thelinkedemployer-employeerecords RAIS (Relac ¸˜ aoAnualdeInformac ¸˜ oesSociais)doc-
umentallformallyemployedworkersandtheirindividualemployersovertimesothatwecancover
nationalformal-sectormigration andconditionon worker-ﬁxedeffectsinestimation. Everyjobob-
servation is identiﬁed by the worker ID (PIS), the plant ID (of which the ﬁrm ID is a systematic
part), the month of accession, and the month of separation. To construct the worker sample, we
take the list of all proper worker IDs (11-digit PIS) that ever appear in RAIS, draw a ten-percent
random sample of workers of any age and gender, and then trace the selected workers through their
formal jobs. For most statistics, we remove multiple jobs and only retain a worker’s highest paying
job at a given moment.7
7We use a subsample of prime-age males in our working paper (Menezes-Filho and Muendler 2007) and ﬁnd
largely similar results.
5We deﬁne a worker’s separation as a quit or layoff from the last formal employment in the
calendar year. Conversely, we deﬁne an accession as a worker’s hiring into the ﬁrst formal em-
ployment in the calendar year. When we infer separations and accessions, we exclude transfers
across plants within the same ﬁrm, as well as retirements and reported deaths on the job. Among
the separations, reported quits are infrequent compared to layoffs (see Table E.1 in the Appendix).
We consider separations as a single category in reported regressions. There is no marked difference
between quits and layoffs in separate regressions. Worker information covers education, tenure,
age, and gender; job information includes an occupation classiﬁcation comparable to ISCO-88
(four-digit level) and the wage; plant information covers sector, municipality, and public-private
ownership categories (see Appendix A for details). In RAIS, we base our sector information on a
mix of the subsector IBGE classiﬁcation (roughly comparable to the NAICS three-digit level) for
the years 1986 through 1993 and the more detailed CNAE classiﬁcation (close to Europe’s NACE
four-digit level) for the later sample years 1994 through 2001.
To RAIS, we link information on the employer’s export status from national customs records.
Annual customs ofﬁce records on exports are available to us from SECEX (Secretaria de Com´ ercio
Exterior) for 1990 through 1998. We set the indicator variable for a ﬁrm’s export status to one if
SECEX records show exports of any product from the ﬁrm in a given year.8 We link the export-
status indicator to RAIS at the ﬁrm level. To obtain direct measures of productivity, we use the
manufacturing survey PIA from the Brazilian census bureau IBGE for the period 1990 to 1998.
PIA is a random sample of all but the smallest manufacturing ﬁrms and offers output, labor and
capital stock information (for details see Appendix B). In order to withdraw PIA data from IBGE,
we obtain randomly tabulated cells of three (to ﬁve) ﬁrms.9 We use the individual tax identiﬁer of
each ﬁrm within a random cell to link PIA to RAIS. We compute labor productivity for every ﬁrm
in a random cell as the cell mean of total factor productivity plus the estimated contributions of the
capitalstockandintermediateinputs. Forthispurpose, weobtaintotalfactorproductivityestimates
fromanOlleyandPakes(1996)method withCobb-Douglasproduction functioncoefﬁcientsfor27
manufacturing sectors at N´ ıvel 50 (comparable to the ISIC3 two-digit level, see Muendler 2004).
8We do not use a minimum exports per sales ratio to deﬁne the export indicator because sales information is only
available for a small subsample of PIA ﬁrms.
9This random aggregation is necessary under conﬁdentiality requirements and has been used before in Menezes-
Filho, Muendler and Ramey (2008), where sample properties are reported.
6Second, we use the metropolitan household survey PME. PME provides direct information
on household members with or without formal-sector employment and covers one work status
transition at the annual horizon for every household member (between the fourth and the eighth
interview). We can control for the individual’s work status during the three months prior to the
fourth interview. PME distinguishes formal employment (with a labor ID card, carteira) and infor-
mal employment (without carteira), as well as self-employment, unemployment, and withdrawals
from the labor force. The labor ID card criterion to deﬁne formality makes the PME classiﬁcation
equal to RAIS. There is a marked increase in informal work status over the 1990s across all sectors.
By far the strongest relative increase in informality occurs in manufacturing, where the share of
informal workers almost doubles from above 6 to 12 percent. Non-manufacturing sectors exhibit
an average increase in informality of only around 50 percent. We map the PME sector information
to twenty sectors comparable to subsector IBGE, close to the atividade-80 classiﬁcation.
We combine sector-level variables from several sources with RAIS and PME at the ﬁnest pos-
sible level. We obtain ad valorem tariffs by sector and year and compute intermediate-input tar-
iffs in addition to product-market tariffs using input-output matrices (see Appendix D). To re-
late our empirical analysis to classic industry-level trade theories, we compute revealed compara-
tive-advantage measures for Brazil from UN Comtrade trade data for 1986-98 following Balassa
(1965).
Idle labor. Individual worker panel data allow us to analyze the incidence of nonemployment in
thereallocationprocess. Wecomputetwomainmeasures. Wedeﬁnetherateoffailedreallocations
as the share of displaced individuals who do not ﬁnd a new formal job within 12 or 48 months, and
we deﬁne the duration of complete reallocations as the average time that a displaced individual
takes to ﬁnd the ﬁrst formal job if successfully reallocated within 12 or 48 months.
For comparisons to GDP, we revisit the evidence from Figure 1, which used the four-year
horizon, with comparable statistics at the annual horizon in Table 1. The table shows that the
share of displaced workers without reallocation for a year increases strongly from 29 to 47 percent
between 1986 and 1998. There is some variation in the failure rate across skill groups and gender
withinanygivenyear: male, young andcollege-educatedworkers’reallocations failless frequently
than average. Time variation, however, dwarfs the group differences. A similar pattern applies to
7Table 1: LABOR MARKET PERFORMANCE AND ECONOMIC OUTCOMES
1986 1990 1992 1994 1998
FAILED REALLOCATIONS WITHIN A YEAR
Mean failure rate (share of displaced) .285 .354 .441 .391 .474
female workers .387 .427 .500 .451 .517
young workers .297 .361 .445 .384 .446
high-school or college educ. workers .305 .350 .416 .366 .435
Change over 1990 .000 .088 .037 .120
Idle labor (foregone share of GDP) .000 .024 .009 .037
DURATIONS OF SUCCESSFUL REALLOCATIONS WITHIN A YEAR
Mean duration (in months) 2.918 3.927 4.280 4.125 4.253
female workers 3.157 3.965 4.097 4.017 4.097
young workers 2.896 3.909 4.184 3.969 4.105
high-school or college educ. workers 2.558 3.397 3.622 3.458 3.633
Change over 1990 (one twelfth) .000 .029 .017 .027
Idle labor (foregone share of GDP) .000 .008 .004 .008
Sources: RAIS 1986-1999 (1-percent random sample), workers nationwide of any gender or age, displaced from a
formal-sector job; not rehired into a formal-sector job within 12 months (upper panel) or rehired into a formal-sector
job within 12 months (lower panel). PME 1986-1999, share of idle prime-age male metropolitan workers (unemployed
or withdrawn from labor force) used for nationwide sample, and Banco Central do Brasil, GDP.
Notes: Young workers have ten or less years of potential labor force experience, high-school or college-educated
workers have some high-school education. Foregone GDP is the unrealized wage bill, measured as the product of
the observed change over 1990 times the number of newly displaced workers during the year times their wage upon
displacement. Idle labor is deﬁned as the share of displaced workers in PME with transitions to unemployment or out
of the labor force.
durations of complete reallocations in the lower panel of Table 1. The relatively minor cross-
sectional differences between gender and skill groups, compared to major time variation, suggests
that studying macroeconomic sources of variation in labor-market outcomes promises to uncover
ﬁrst-order changes in labor-market outcomes.
These ﬁgures suggest that idle resources in the labor market are a crucial aspect of Brazil’s
aggregate performance. For reallocation failures in the upper panel of Table 1, we calculate the
foregone share of GDP as the unrealized wage bill that the additional failures after 1990 imply,
given a displaced worker’s last wage. We only consider the share of displaced formal-sector
workers as idle who typically become unemployed or move out of the labor force in metropoli-
tan labor-markets—a 36 percent share on average in the metropolitan household data 1990-98. We
assume that the remaining 64 percent of displaced workers immediately take up an informal job
or self-employment and fully retain their pre-displacement earnings. This makes our estimates
of foregone GDP conservative. The magnitudes are nevertheless striking. The unrealized wages
8implied by additional reallocation failures after 1990 amount to 2.4 percent of foregone GDP in
1992 and 3.7 percent in 1998. The increased duration of complete reallocations in the lower panel
of Table 1 implies another 0.8 percent of foregone GDP in 1992 and 1998. This brings the total
foregone wage bill to more than 3 percent of GDP in 1992, to more than 1 percent in 1994 (a year
with strong GDP growth), and to 4.5 percent in 1998.
Labor versus product-market reallocation. Labor reallocation is distinct from the reallocation
of product market shares. If a ﬁrm’s labor productivity ϕ  y/ℓ rises faster than its output y,
then the output expansion ^ y is associated with an employment reduction ^ ℓ = ^ y   ^ ϕ < 0. A
productivity increase typically results in a less than proportional output increase ^ y < ^ ϕ if the price
elasticity of demand is below unity, as observed across most Brazilian industries (Asano and Fiuza
2003).10 Similarly, if ﬁrms exit but survivors and entrants raise labor productivity faster than their
output, output shares are being reallocated to more productive survivors while workers shift in
the opposite direction. Product-market reallocations to more productive ﬁrms and simultaneous
workforce shifts away from more productive ﬁrms are thus a theoretical possibility.
Reverse resource and product-market reallocations are Brazil’s reality during the 1990s, as
Table 2 documents. The table decomposes revenue-based total factor productivity (columns 1-4)
and labor productivity (columns 5-8) into the contributions of ﬁrm-level productivity and ﬁrm-
level weights, where the weights are output in the case of total factor productivity and employment
in the case of labor productivity (alternative weights preserve the patterns). Following Olley and
Pakes (1996), aggregate productivity in the cross section of ﬁrms (columns 1 and 5) is split into the
unweighted mean productivity level (columns 2 and 6) and the covariance between deviations of
the weights and productivities from annual means (columns 3 and 7). The relative log TFP change
of 3.5 percent between 1990 and 1998 is modest (column 1).11 Substantial capital accumulation
contributes to the faster increase in log labor productivity by 7.3 percent between 1990 and 1998
10Under a price elasticity of demand εy,p and a productivity elasticity of price εp,ϕ, we have ˆ y = εy,p εp,ϕ ˆ ϕ so that
ˆ y < ˆ ϕ if and only if εp,ϕ < 1/εy,p. The condition εp,ϕ < 1/εy,p can only be violated if productivity-induced price
drops are considerably faster than productivity increases, at a rate above the inverse price elasticity of demand. In
monopolistically competitive markets with Dixit-Stiglitz demand, or perfectly competitive markets, prices drop at the
rate of productivity increase (εp,ϕ = 1).
11In Table 2, we divide aggregate log productivity levels by the aggregate 1990 log level. Rebasing to 1986 at the
ﬁrm level in Muendler (2004) yields a 4.7 percent increase between 1990 and 1998.
9Table 2: PRODUCTIVITY VARIATION ACROSS FIRMS AND OVER TIME
TFP & Output shares Labor Prod. & Employment shares Outp.&Empl.
Cross section Ann. chg. Cross section Ann. chg. Ann. chg.
wgtd. unwgtd. cov. avg. corr.a wgtd. unwgtd. cov. avg. corr.a avg. corr.a
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1986 1.018 .924 .095 1.011 1.019 -.008
1990 1.000 .899 .101 .165 1.000 .997 .003 -.164 .182
1992 1.017 .911 .105 .142 1.015 1.008 .007 -.198 -.093
1994 1.013 .918 .096 .135 1.023 1.019 .005 -.183 .166
1998 1.035 .910 .125 .148 1.073 1.043 .030 -.170 .367
aPeriod averages of correlation coefﬁcients (periods 1986-90, 1990-92, 1992-94, 1994-98).
Source: PIA ﬁrms 1986-98 (1991 missing); log total factor productivity from Muendler (2004) based on Olley and
Pakes (1996) estimation (at N´ ıvel 50), inferring labor productivity under changing capital stocks and intermediate-
input uses.
Note: Cross-sectional productivity decomposition as in Olley and Pakes (1996): yt = ¯ yt +
∑
i ∆θit∆yit, where yt
is weighted and ¯ yt is unweighted mean log productivity, θ denotes the weights and ∆ deviations from cross-section
means (rebased to unity in 1990). Annual change correlations (correlation coefﬁcients) relate ∆t 1θi,t and ∆t 1yi,t
as well as employment changes and output changes, where ∆t 1 denotes the ﬁrst difference between t and t   1.
(column 5). Alongside, Table 2 reports the raw covariance of year-over-year productivity changes
at surviving ﬁrms (columns 4 and 8)—a term in the Haltiwanger (1997) decomposition over time.12
The decompositions in Table 2 show for the cross section of Brazilian manufacturers that ﬁrms
with higher total factor productivity (TFP) command larger product-market shares (column 3).13
Over time, TFP improvements among survivors are associated with gains in product-market shares
(column 4). These facts are well known for Brazil and similar countries, but sometimes con-
founded with resource allocation. The cross-sectional covariance between labor productivity and
employment shares, in fact, is considerably weaker (column 7) than between TFP and product-
market shares (column 3). Most strikingly, ﬁrm-level labor productivity advances are associated
with reductions in employment shares (column 8).14 These correlation patterns are not speciﬁc to
Brazil. Pag´ es et al. (2009) show for thirteen Latin American economies that labor reallocation and
12Centered covariances exhibit a similar pattern as the raw covariances, with always positive TFP and always nega-
tive labor productivity covariations. To facilitate comparisons to other research, we report the raw covariance from the
Haltiwanger decomposition.
13This cross-sectional covariation is not necessarily reﬂective of an efﬁcient product-market share allocation. Under
a Cobb-Douglas production function and revenue-based TFP measures, revenue per input composite is theoretically
a constant across ﬁrms, irrespective of potentially different quantity-based TFP levels (Hsieh and Klenow 2009). By
construction, a part of the positive covariation is due to output entering the TFP numerator.
14Mostly ﬁrm exits raise the covariance between labor productivity and employment in the cross section over time
(column 7).
10employer-level productivity growth are negatively related between the early 1990s and the early
2000s. Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (2001) document that changes in manhours are negatively
associated with productivity change among continuing U.S. plants for 1977-1992. Employment
enters the denominator of labor productivity, however, so employment is negatively related to la-
bor productivity by construction. Inference on labor shifts therefore requires more direct evidence.
For this purpose, column 9 shows the correlation between sales and employment changes. As
expected, sales and employment tend to move in the same direction during most periods, with
the important exception of the trade liberalization episode 1990-92, when ﬁrms that expand sales
contract employment. This is consistent with the hypothesis that labor moves in the opposite di-
rection of product-market reallocation during Brazil’s trade reform while ﬁrm-level productivity
increases.15
Economic reforms. In 1990, the Brazilian government breaks with the country’s decade-old im-
portsubstitutionpolicy, whichprovidedmoreprotectiontosectorswithlowcomparativeadvantage
(Pavcnik, Blom, Goldberg and Schady 2004), and embarks on a substantial trade liberalization.
Earlier ad valorem tariff reductions in the late 1980s were less effective because of binding non-
tariff barriers (Kume, Piani and Souza 2003). The far-reaching trade reform under the Collor de
Melo administration in 1990 involves both the removal of non-tariff barriers and the adoption of a
new tariff structure. Collor abolishes all non-tariff barriers by presidential decree on his ﬁrst day in
ofﬁce and implements a tariff schedule with lower levels and less cross-sectoral dispersion, to be
completed by 1993. As shown in Figure 1 above, product tariffs drop from an average level of 63
percent in 1987 to 15 percent by 1997. While product tariffs range between 21 (metallic products)
and 63 percent (apparel and textiles) in 1990, they drop to a range between 9 percent (chemicals)
and 34 percent (transport equipment) in 1997. Brazil’s tariff structure continues to afford effec-
tive protection to manufacturing industries. In 1990, product tariffs are around 45 percent above
intermediate-input tariffs in value-added terms. By 1997 the reduced cross-sector dispersion of
tariffs results in a smaller rate of effective protection of about 20 percent on average.
15The descriptive evidence so far is also consistent with the hypothesis by Nishida and Petrin (2009) for Chile and
Colombia that deregulation erodes markups faster at employment-expanding ﬁrms. While markups may also drop
in Brazil, our direct evidence on worker ﬂows below ﬁrmly establishes that employment falls at exporters and in
comparative-advantage industries as product tariffs are reduced.
11Additional reforms partly coincide with trade liberalization. Privatization efforts for public
utilities begin in the early 1990s and accelerate by the mid 1990s, while Brazil simultaneously
removes capital-account restrictions. In 1994, drastic anti-inﬂation measures succeed for the ﬁrst
time in decades. These reforms are accompanied by a surge of foreign direct investment inﬂows
during the mid 1990s and advances in outsourcing of service jobs across domestic employers.
These pro-competitive product-market reforms of the 1990s were preceded by a labor-market
reform in 1988: Brazil’s new constitution introduced a series of changes that reduced the work
week and increased overtime premia and beneﬁts—signiﬁcantly raising labor costs (Paes de Bar-
ros and Corseuil 2004). Concomitant reforms not withstanding, its scope and pace make trade
liberalization a focal candidate to explain employment shifts and work status transitions. In the
empirical analysis that follows we apply statistical treatments to control for concomitant and pre-
ceding economic changes.
Worker reallocation. Worker panels allow us to observe the direction of labor ﬂows. We use
the four-year horizon to infer long-term reallocation. Within ﬁfty months, 95 percent of complete
reallocations are complete in 1986-2001 (median duration of six months). Table 3 reports transi-
tions of displaced workers from formal-sector jobs to other formal-sector jobs (columns 1-6) and
the share of displaced workers with no observed formal-sector rehiring at the four-year horizon
(column 7). Retained workers do not enter the statistics. Agricultural, mining and manufacturing
plants are grouped into their sector’s comparative advantage quintiles at the subsector IBGE level.
All other sectors—commerce, services, construction, utilities, and public administration—are con-
sidered nontraded in the table.
The majority of successful worker reallocations within traded-goods sectors is to employers
in the same comparative-advantage quintile: transition rates along the diagonal in the ﬁve traded-
merchandise sectors far exceed those off the diagonal (column 1-5). These worker ﬂows within
sectors are consistent with the idea that reallocations between employers in an industry are domi-
nant, asnewtradetheoryposits, andwarrantalinkofworkerpaneldatatoemployercharacteristics.
The largest fraction of workers with displacement from a traded-goods industry, about a two-
ﬁfths, ﬁnds employment in nontraded sectors (column 6). And almost as many workers with
displacements from a traded-goods sector, roughly another two-ﬁfths, are not rehired into any for-
12Table 3: FOUR-YEAR SECTOR TRANSITIONS AND FAILURES
Traded: Comp. adv. quintilea Non-
To: 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th traded Failure Total
From: (in %) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Traded: Comp. adv.a
1st quintile 28.0 6.8 2.4 5.7 3.0 30.1 24.0 100.0
2nd quintile 9.2 17.9 3.1 5.8 4.7 35.5 23.9 100.0
3rd quintile 5.3 4.9 15.4 13.0 3.2 32.7 25.6 100.0
4th quintile 4.5 4.2 8.3 23.3 5.8 30.4 23.6 100.0
5th quintile 3.9 4.0 2.3 9.9 24.7 32.8 22.4 100.0
Nontraded 2.6 2.2 1.6 3.8 2.8 58.5 28.5 100.0
Failure 5.7 3.0 4.1 11.5 7.3 68.4 .0 100.0
Implied stationary distrib.b 3.4 2.6 2.0 4.5 3.3 41.3 42.8 100.0
Impl. stat. distrib. 1990-94b 3.7 2.7 1.8 6.5 4.4 40.9 40.0 100.0
Impl. stat. distrib. 1994-98b 2.2 1.7 1.8 3.5 2.3 35.6 53.0 100.0
aBalassa (1965) comparative advantage, transition year quintile (5th: strongest advantage).
bFailure adjustment of stationary distribution based on estimate of 4-year nonformal-to-nonformal transitions from
PME (for 1986-98 64.9% of nonformal PME workers are in nonformal work status after three annual transitions,
replacing the zero from RAIS, 65.3% for 1990-94, and 71.7% for 1994-98).
Sources: RAIS 1986, 1990, 1994 and 1998 (1-percent random sample), workers nationwide of any gender or age; and
PME 1986-1999. UN Comtrade 1986-98 for Balassa comparative advantage at subsector IBGE level.
Note: Transition frequencies refer to employments in Brazil four years after separation, based on last employment
of year (highest paying job if many). Failed accessions are separations followed by no formal-sector employment
anywhere in Brazil within four years, excluding workers with retirement or death, or age 65 or above in past job. The
stationary distribution is the normalized left eigenvector of the PME-corrected RAIS transition matrix associated with
the eigenvalue of one.
mal job within four years (column 7). These patterns are broadly consistent with the idea that
work status changes out of formality (recorded as failures here), and jobs in nontraded sectors,
provide a buffer for labor reallocation after trade reform. Repeating the statistical exercise for var-
ious subperiods shows that reallocation patterns in traded-goods industries change over time, as
summarized by the implied stationary distributions for subperiods, with absorption in nontraded
sectors declining over time while the share of failed reallocations increases. We now turn to re-
gression predictions of these worker ﬂows to discern the extent to which trade or other variables
affect the worker transitions.
133 Separations and Accessions
Estimation. Employers adjust workforces through separations and accessions. Separations in
turn burden, and accessions unburden, the pool of workers to be reallocated. We consider the
probability that an employer-employee match is terminated (a separation) or is formed (an ac-






= zS(J(it))tβz + yJ(it)tβy + xitβx + αi + αS(J(it))t + αt, (1)
where σit denotes the binary outcome (σit = Ait accession or not, σit = Sit separation or not)
for worker i at time t. zS(J(it))t is a vector of sector-level covariates of the worker’s displacing
or hiring sector S(J(it)) including a sector-ﬁxed effect and, in some speciﬁcations, a sector-year
trend; yJ(it)t is a vector of plant-level covariates of worker i’s displacing or hiring plant J(it); xit
is a vector of covariates that are worker, job or match speciﬁc; βz, βy, βx are coefﬁcient vectors; αi
is the worker-ﬁxed effect, αJ(it)t a sector-ﬁxed effect, and αt a year effect. There is an unobserved
error to terminations and formations of employer-employee matches, which we assume to be mean
independent in the above linear probability model.16 Coefﬁcients on worker and job covariates
are identiﬁed from time variation within and across employers. Educational attainment changes
little for individuals in the labor force, however. We consequently drop education categories from
the worker characteristics vector but keep educational workforce composition shares among the
plant-level regressors.
We cluster standard errors at the worker and at the sector level. Workers switch sector so that
non-nested clustering requires a two-way correction (Cameron, Gelbach and Miller 2011). For this
purpose, we ﬁrst obtain the variance-covariance matrix from a worker-ﬁxed effects regression clus-
tering on sectors as if switching workers did not cross clusters, then obtain the variance-covariance
16For theoretical consistency with random shocks to employer-employee matches, we alternatively assume the







expfzS(J(it))tβz + yJ(it)tβy + xitβx + αi + αS(J(it))t + αtg
1 + expfzS(J(it))tβz + yJ(it)tβy + xitβx + αi + αS(J(it))t + αtg
using conditional maximum likelihood estimation (the full maximum likelihood estimator is inconsistent). The condi-
tional maximum likelihood function for individual workers does not permit (non-nested) clustering of standard errors
at the sector level.
14matrix from a worker-ﬁxed effects regression clustering at the worker level, and ﬁnally we obtain
a Huber-White robust variance-covariance matrix to arrive at our estimated variance-covariance
matrix as the sum of the former two matrices less the third matrix. We use a mix of twelve man-
ufacturing sectors at the subsector IBGE level in 1990-1993 and 266 manufacturing industries at
the CNAE level in 1994-98 to obtain a large set of clusters and plausibly achieve consistency of the
standard errors.
Benchmark estimates on the full sample. Table 4 reports estimates of the linear probability
model (1) for separations from and accessions to formal manufacturing jobs. Speciﬁcations in
columns 1 and 4 do not condition on worker-ﬁxed effects (only on sector and year effects). In the
separation regressions this lacking conditioning results in statistically insigniﬁcant trade-related
predictors (sector-level tariffs and ﬁrm-level export status). In contrast, once we condition on
worker-ﬁxed effects in columns 2 and 5, export status and the product market tariff become statis-
tically signiﬁcant in the separation regression and, in the accession regression, the product-market
tariff coefﬁcient more than doubles. This is consistent with the idea that high- and low-turnover
workers match with certain sectors and ﬁrm types, confounding estimates, and underscores the
importance of linked employer-employee data for estimation.17
We consider the estimates in columns 2 and 5 of Table 4 our benchmark. An elevated product
tariff predicts lower separation rates from formal jobs (with a p-value of .057 while subsequent
speciﬁcations robustly show the effect at p-values below .05). So Brazil’s trade reform triggers
additional separations through reduced product-market tariffs. Input tariffs in the regression cap-
ture the effective rate of protection but are not signiﬁcantly associated with either job separations
or accessions. Separations are signiﬁcantly more frequent at exporters, contrary to predictions of
classic and new trade theory. Among the sector-level controls, FDI inﬂows into the sector predict a
statistically signiﬁcant reduction in job separations. The sectoral real exchange and the Herﬁndahl
concentration index have no signiﬁcant predictive power after conditioning on year effects.
At the opposite margin of job accessions (column 5), elevated product tariffs predict signiﬁ-
17The worker-ﬁxed component may capture worker motivation and persistence, and similar non-cognitive abilities
(on their early formation see e.g. Cunha, Heckman and Schennach 2010), differentially affecting retentions and tenure
by activity.
15Table 4: SEPARATIONS AND ACCESSIONS
Separations Accessions
Sample RAIS RAIS RAIS RAIS RAIS RAIS
Estimator OLS FE FE-IV OLS FE FE-IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Product Market Tariff -.091 -.187 -.263 .102 .243 .309
(.098) (.098) (.021) (.052) (.122) (.021)
Intm. Input Tariff .253 .297 .192 -.197 -.430 -.328
(.195) (.289) (.032) (.092) (.352) (.032)
Exporter Status .006 .037 .067 -.056 -.048 -.211
(.005) (.003) (.032) (.004) (.002) (.031)
Sector-level covariates
FDI Flow (USD billion) -.011 -.014 -.012 .007 .009 .009
(.004) (.005) (.0006) (.003) (.004) (.0006)
Sector real exch. rate -.109 -.116 -.151 .228 .122 .066
(.140) (.220) (.018) (.102) (.284) (.018)
Herﬁndahl Index (sales) -.163 -.158 -.018 .150 .127 -.015
(.059) (.097) (.005) (.075) (.095) (.005)
Plant-level covariates
Log Employment -.020 -.060 -.063 -.021 -.015 .001
(.002) (.002) (.003) (.002) (.001) (.003)
Worker-level covariates
Tenure at plant (in years) -.139 .140 .139
(.007) (.005) (.001)
Sqrd. Tenure at plant (sq. yrs.) .020 -.016 -.017
(.0008) (.0009) (.0002)
Pot. labor force experience .00009 .001 .001 -.006 -.001 -.001
(.0001) (.00008) (.00006) (.0001) (.0002) (.00006)
Prof. or Manag’l. Occ. -.084 -.037 -.038 -.154 -.067 -.070
(.005) (.003) (.002) (.007) (.004) (.002)
Tech’l. or Superv. Occ. -.076 -.034 -.034 -.142 -.073 -.076
(.005) (.004) (.002) (.006) (.004) (.002)
Unskilled Wh. Collar Occ. -.064 -.035 -.036 -.115 -.066 -.069
(.005) (.003) (.002) (.006) (.004) (.002)
Skilled Bl. Collar Occ. -.024 -.003 -.004 -.072 -.064 -.064
(.005) (.002) (.0009) (.007) (.004) (.0009)
Worker effects yes yes yes yes
Sector effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 5,338,164 5,338,164 5,326,737 5,303,710 5,303,710 5,292,404
R2 (within) .068 .056 .097 .033
Sources: RAIS 1990-98 (10-percent random sample), workers nationwide of any gender or age, separated from or
acceding into manufacturing job; SECEX 1990-98; and complementary sector data.
Note: Separations exclude transfers, deaths, and retirements; accessions exclude transfers. Reference observations are
employments with no reported separation or accession in a given year. Plant-level controls (share of some college,
some high school and white-collar occupations) not reported. Sector information at subsector IBGE level 1990-93 and
CNAE 4-digit level 1994-98. Instruments for the three endogenous variables Product-market tariffs, Intermediate input
tariffs and Export Status are PPI in Europe, PPI in North America, non-Brazilian imports to Asia-Paciﬁc, Central and
Eastern European, North American, Other Industrialized and Western European countries (at subsector IBGE level
1990-98). See Table G.1 for the ﬁrst stage. Standard errors in parentheses (two-way clustering at worker and sector
level following Cameron et al. 2011, except non-clustered IV):  signiﬁcance at ten,  ﬁve,  one percent.
16cantly more accessions, mirroring the sign from the separation regression (column 2). Exporters
exhibit signiﬁcantly lower accession rates, also mirroring their higher separation rates and contrary
to predictions of classic and new trade theory. FDI inﬂows are associated with signiﬁcantly more
accessions.
Larger manufacturing plants exhibit less turnover: they displace signiﬁcantly fewer (column 2)
and hire signiﬁcantly fewer workers (column 5). The separation rate convexly drops with tenure
in the absence of worker-ﬁxed effects (column 1), but concavely increases with tenure when we
condition on unobserved worker effects (column 2). This sign reversal is consistent with the con-
ventional explanation that over time the employer learns about the worker’s initially unobserved
ability so that the separation rate drops as more workers’ abilities in a cohort become known. The
worker effect in the regression is a measure of worker ability over the full sample period so that,
conditional on this ability measure, the employer’s heightened incentive to dismiss workers with
long tenure prevails under Brazil’s severance pay law, which make retentions increasingly costly
as wages increase with tenure (see Appendix A on incentives for dismissals and rehires). Workers
in occupations of intermediate skill intensity experience relatively fewer separations, and workers
are relatively less likely to be hired into high-skill intensive manufacturing occupations.
Instrumental-variable regressions. A concern with evidence so far is that Brazil’s preceding
reform of labor institutions in 1988 may relate to falling trade barriers through sector attributes,
including labor turnover characteristics over time. Moreover, the reduction in tariff dispersion
gives rise to a simultaneity concern despite the apparently exogenous nature of trade reform for
individual employers (the enactment by decree on president Collor’s ﬁrst day in ofﬁce surprises
politicians and businesses alike). By design, initially highly protected sectors face the largest
producttariffdeclines, whichareinturnspreadoverlongerphase-outperiods. Wethereforepredict
tariffs at the sector level with instrumental variables. At the ﬁrm-level, employers decide exporting
status and labor turnover simultaneously. We therefore also predict export status with instruments.
Our main instrumental variables are imports into Brazil’s export destinations from countries
other than Brazil, weighted with Brazil’s sectoral export volumes in the base year 1990. We use
WTF (NBER) data on bilateral trade 1990-98 to construct the instruments by subsector IBGE and
17CNAE for seven world regions by year.18 To avoid spurious correlations between Brazilian labor-
market outcomes and neighboring countries’ imports, we omit Latin America from the export
destinations. As additional sector-level instruments we use two important components of Brazil’s
sectoral real exchange rates: the sector price levels in the United States/Canada and the EU. The
identifying assumption for these instruments is that changes in foreign competitive conditions can-
not affect the termination and formation of job matches in Brazil other than through trade-related
variables.19
The foreign-competition instruments prove to be signiﬁcant covariates of sector tariffs and
ﬁrm-level export status. On the ﬁrst stage, we regress product tariffs, input tariffs and export status
on the instrumental variables, weighting the regressions by the employment observations in the
separation and accession samples. (Table G.1 in the Appendix shows results by sample.) There
is no evidence of weak instruments: F statistics from joint signiﬁcance tests on the instruments
vary between 100 and more than 80,000. The instruments are statistically signiﬁcant predictors
at the one-percent level. Brazil’s tariff schedule is arguably related to the foreign-competition
instruments by policy design, whereas ﬁrm-level exports expectedly respond to foreign compet-
itive conditions. Non-Brazilian imports into Brazil’s export destinations can either be positively
related to Brazilian exports, if they reﬂect strong foreign demand shocks, or negatively, if Brazil-
ian ﬁrms face tougher competition from non-Brazilian suppliers. Producer prices in the United
States/Canada and the EU are signiﬁcantly associated with Brazilian tariffs and exports, with their
sign depending on the inclusion of the remaining instruments.
Using instrumented tariffs and export status in estimation equation (1), there is not a single
sign reversal in the potentially simultaneity-afﬂicted coefﬁcients—on tariffs and export status—as
columns 3 and 6 of Table 4 show. In summary, instrumentation corroborates our main explanation
18We calculate sector-speciﬁc weights for each foreign destination country in 1990 using SECEX exports data for
Brazil (based on RAIS sector information for the SECEX exporters). We then calculate aggregate imports into each
foreign country, excepting imports from Brazil, and weight the country aggregates with Brazilian export volumes
by sector and destination in 1990. We ﬁnally aggregate the sector-weighted country totals to seven world regions and
obtain seven foreign import-demand instruments that vary by sector and year. The seven world regions are Asia-Paciﬁc
Developing countries (APD), Central and Eastern European countries (CEE), Latin American and Caribbean countries
(LAC), North American countries (NAM excluding Mexico), Other Developing countries (ODV), Other Industrialized
countries (OIN), and Western European countries (WEU).
19Importpenetrationmayalsobeafunctionofforeigncompetitiveconditionsandaffectexportersandnon-exporters
alike. The inclusion of import penetration does not alter results but thwarts interpretation (we report according results
in Menezes-Filho and Muendler 2007).
18for lacking labor reallocation: reduced product tariffs raise separations and reduce accessions.
Exporters separate from their workers signiﬁcantly more frequently than the average employer and
hire less frequently.
We perform several additional robustness checks. Results for three such checks are reported
in Table G.2 (Appendix G). The privatization of state-owned businesses and the progressing out-
sourcing of service jobs (tercerizac ¸˜ ao) to specialized suppliers partly coincide with trade reform,
so we address the omitted variable concern for a subsample with according information (privati-
zation in columns 1 and 4, outsourcing in 2 and 5). The signs of our main coefﬁcient estimates
on tariffs and export status, and their statistical signiﬁcance, remain unaltered. Linear probabil-
ity models raise the concern that mass points in the distribution, such as from unobserved worker
characteristics, can bias results, so we also run a conditional (worker-ﬁxed effects) logit regression.
Sign patters of the main coefﬁcients are again unaltered.
Classic and new trade theories. Having established that exporting ﬁrms behave differently in
periods of trade reform, we now investigate interactions with main sector and employer charac-
teristics. This allows us to examine whether sectors and ﬁrms react as predicted by classic trade
theory and new trade theories of heterogeneous ﬁrms. The sector-level measure of revealed com-
parative advantage turns out to vary little over time for Brazil in 1990-98 so we interact it with
tariffs in the presence of sector ﬁxed effects. Columns 1 and 4 of Table 5 show that, contrary
to standard trade theory, the negative association of product tariffs with separations is stronger in
comparative advantage sectors and so is their positive association with hirings. So comparative-
advantage sectors displace signiﬁcantly more and hire fewer workers than the average sector when
product tariffs fall. Input tariffs exhibit the opposite signs, as they generally do in our regressions.
A consistent explanation is that effective rates of protection increase in product tariffs but fall in
input tariffs.
In columns 2 and 5 we interact the tariff variables with export status. Estimates show that the
effect of trade liberalization is stronger for exporting ﬁrms, which displace more than the average
ﬁrm as a result of trade reform, contrary to results of static new trade theory with exogenous ﬁrm
productivity. Coefﬁcients at the hirings margin are not statistically signiﬁcant. Columns 3 and 6
include interactions of tariffs with both export status and comparative advantage measures, and
19Table 5: SEPARATIONS AND ACCESSIONS: ADDITIONAL SPECIFICATIONS
Separations Accessions
Sample RAIS RAIS RAIS RAIS RAIS RAIS
Estimator FE FE FE FE FE FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Prd. Trff.Comp. Adv. -.270 -.288 .332 .317
(.117) (.118) (.161) (.153)
Intm. Trff.Comp. Adv. .400 .415 -.424 -.397
(.118) (.117) (.188) (.183)
Prd. Trff.Exporter -.090 -.146 -.098 -.033
(.047) (.042) (.101) (.086)
Intm. Trff.Exporter .209 .273 -.060 -.140
(.063) (.057) (.132) (.112)
Product Market Tariff .201 -.118 .335 -.236 .301 -.201
(.137) (.107) (.156) (.164) (.179) (.180)
Intm. Input Tariff -.294 .176 -.501 .306 -.437 .321
(.288) (.288) (.289) (.287) (.391) (.299)
Exporter Status .038 .023 .025 -.047 -.017 -.017
(.003) (.005) (.005) (.003) (.007) (.007)
Worker effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sector effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 5,195,376 5,338,164 5,195,376 5,164,959 5,303,710 5,164,959
R2 .057 .056 .057 .033 .034 .033
Sources: RAIS 1990-98 (10-percent random sample), workers nationwide of any gender or age, separated from or
acceding into manufacturing job; SECEX 1990-98; and complementary sector data.
Note: Balassa (1965) revealed comparative advantage measure for the initial year 1990. Separations exclude transfers,
deaths, and retirements; accessions exclude transfers. Reference observations are employments with no reported
separation or accession in a given year. Additional regressors (not reported) as in Table 4. Sector information at
subsector IBGE level 1990-93 and CNAE 4-digit level 1994-98. Standard errors in parentheses (two-way clustering at
worker and sector level following Cameron et al. 2011):  signiﬁcance at ten,  ﬁve,  one percent.
their association with separations remains statistically signiﬁcant and at odds with classic and new
trade theories. At the accessions margin, only comparative advantage interactions stay signiﬁcant.
We turn to interactions of tariffs with main worker characteristics. In contrast to the importance
ofsectorandemployercharacteristics, theinteractionbetweentradevariablesandworkerattributes
is generally not signiﬁcantly related to separations and accessions. As reported in Table G.3 in the
Appendix, the only signiﬁcant differential effect is that high-school educated workers experience
less frequent hirings when input tariffs are low. The generally lacking difference between worker
groups reconﬁrms our descriptive evidence in Table 1, where cross-group differences in realloca-
tion outcomes were minor compared to time variation. Most importantly, young workers (with ten
or less years of potential labor force experience) exhibit no differential response. This ﬁnding is
consistent with our maintained assumption that cohort entry and exit do not signiﬁcantly interact
20Table 6: SEPARATIONS, ACCESSIONS AND PRODUCTIVITY
Separations Accessions
Sample RAIS-PIA RAIS-PIA RAIS-PIA RAIS-PIA RAIS-PIA RAIS-PIA
Estimator FE FE FE FE FE FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Product Market Tariff -.174 -.144 -.148 .168 .079 .082
(.057) (.057) (.057) (.053) (.046) (.046)
Intm. Input Tariff .260 .266 .287 -.291 -.116 -.119
(.175) (.230) (.233) (.189) (.152) (.154)
Exporter Status .010 .009 -.022 -.021
(.004) (.004) (.003) (.003)
Log LP .014 -.004
(.004) (.003)
Worker effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sector effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sector-year trend yes yes yes yes
Observations 1,860,763 1,860,763 1,860,763 1,845,911 1,845,911 1,845,911
R2 .079 .079 .079 .037 .039 .039
Sources: RAIS 1990-98 (10-percent random sample), workers nationwide of any gender or age, separated from or
acceding into manufacturing job; PIA 1990-98 random three-ﬁrm aggregates; SECEX 1990-98; and complementary
sector data.
Note: Balassa (1965) revealed comparative advantage measure for the initial year 1990. Separations exclude transfers,
deaths, and retirements; accessions exclude transfers. Reference observations are employments with no reported
separation or accession in a given year. Additional regressors (not reported) as in Table 4. Sector information at
subsector IBGE level 1990-93 and CNAE 4-digit level 1994-98. Standard errors in parentheses (two-way clustering at
worker and sector level following Cameron et al. 2011):  signiﬁcance at ten,  ﬁve,  one percent.
with the timing of trade liberalization.20
Overall, estimates so far show that drops in Brazil’s product tariffs predict more worker sepa-
rations and fewer accessions, while exporters separate from their workers signiﬁcantly more fre-
quently and hire signiﬁcantly less frequently than other ﬁrms. These ﬁndings are hard to reconcile
with conventional trade and multi-sector macroeonomic theories that predict that inputs shift in
lock-step with product-market reallocation. However, our earlier descriptive evidence, by which
ﬁrms that raise productivity gain product-market shares but lose employment shares (Table 2),
suggests an explanation.
20We also perform a cohort decomposition for Brazil in 1986, 1990, 1994 and 1998, similar to that in Kim and
Topel (1995) for South Korea, and do not ﬁnd important changes in cohort composition by experience (four or less
years of potential labor force experience) over time or across sector quintiles of comparative advantage (see our online
Data Supplement).
21Labor productivity. We hypothesize that heightened foreign competition in Brazilian product
markets induces endogenous productivity growth at continuing ﬁrms, while uncompetitive ﬁrms
exit. Among the possible sources of endogenous productivity change at survivors are reorgani-
zations with more efﬁcient principal-agent relationships (Raith 2003), innovations of production
processes (Aghion, Blundell, Grifﬁth, Howitt and Prantl 2009), and the introduction of products
(Atkeson and Burstein 2010). Under changing productivity, as argued above, a below-unity price
elasticity of demand typically implies that ﬁrms and sectors that expand their product market share
shed employment. Incentives for innovation differ across sectors. In a Schumpeterian growth
model, foreign entry spurs innovation only in sectors close to the technology frontier (Aghion et
al. 2009). This insight can explain why comparative-advantage sectors reduce employment. In-
novation incentives also differ across ﬁrms. The rents to innovation are larger for exporters with
access to foreign markets (Yeaple 2005, Ederington and McCalman 2008, Costantini and Melitz
2008). This prediction can explain why exporters reduce employment.
To investigate the role of labor productivity, and its possible association with export status more
closely, we bring information from the manufacturing survey PIA to our regressions. PIA covers a
sample of all but the smallest manufacturing ﬁrms. For comparison we ﬁrst repeat our benchmark
regression (columns 2 and 5 in Table 4) with the combined RAIS-PIA sample. Columns 1 and 4
of Table 6 show estimates of estimation equation (1) for the subsample of RAIS plants that belong
to a PIA ﬁrm. Compared to estimates for the RAIS universe in prior tables, basic sign patterns
are unaltered while magnitudes drop somewhat, suggesting that medium-sized to large ﬁrms react
less responsively to trade shocks at impact. Lacking instruments for ﬁrm-level changes other than
export status, we include sector-year trends in the regressions in columns 2 and 5 and ﬁnd basic
patterns unaltered. This result, together with the earlier corroboration from instrumental-variable
regressions, renders it little plausible that changes to labor institutions under the constitutional
labor-market reforms in 1988, preceding trade liberalization in 1990, lead to erroneous attribution
of labor-market effects to trade.
To assess whether labor productivity is a similarly relevant predictor of separations and acces-
sions as export status, we include the ﬁrms’ labor productivity in the regression. As columns 3
and 6 in Table 6 show, more productive ﬁrms separate from more workers and hire fewer workers.
22The lower accession probability at more productive ﬁrms is not statistically signiﬁcant, perhaps
because random three-ﬁrm aggregation harms precision. The evidence nevertheless suggests that
ﬁrms with higher productivity exhibit similar employment choices as do exporters.21
Itremainstobeseenwhethertradeliberalizationisassociatedwithlaborproductivityincreases.
Table 7 investigates just that, by regressing labor productivity and capital per worker on our trade
variables. Column 1 reports the results from a ﬁrm-level ﬁxed-effects regression and shows no
signiﬁcant effect of the product tariff. As argued before, the tariff variable is subject to simultaneity
concerns because initially highly protected sectors with less productive ﬁrms face stronger tariff
dropsandlongerphase-outperiodsbydesign. Wethereforeinstrumentthetraderegressorswiththe
foreign-competition variables as described above. Results in column 2 show that reduced product
tariffs raise ﬁrm-level labor productivity, as in Muendler (2004), and conﬁrm that exporters raise
labor productivity faster than the average ﬁrm, as theory predicts. Column 3 shows that these
productivity improvements come through capital deepening: product tariff reductions and export
status lead to more intensive capital use per worker.
In summary, an interpretation consistent with our descriptive and regression evidence so far
is that heightened product-market competition after unilateral trade reform induces productivity
growth among surviving ﬁrms, resulting in lower employment especially at exporters who raise
labor productivity faster. This process is consistent with productivity shocks in dynamic trade the-
ories (e.g. Ederington and McCalman 2008, Costantini and Melitz 2008) and does not necessarily
have adverse welfare consequences. At the same time, however, the Brazilian economy suffers
an increasing incidence of idle resources, so we now ask to what extent trade affects labor-market
adjustment.
4 Reallocation
We turn to worker reallocation and investigate trade-related transitions between sectors as well
as work status types. Denote the set of employment outcomes (sectors of employment or work
status types) with S. An individual’s probability to move to outcome σi;t+1, conditional on present
21Trade-induced technical change can also lead to differential earnings responses (see e.g. Neary 2002) and alter
the wage distribution under assortative matching of workers to employers (e.g. Yeaple 2005).
23Table 7: PRODUCTIVITY
Dependent variable Log Labor Prod. Log Labor Prod. Log Capital/Empl.
Estimator FE FE-IV FE-IV
(1) (2) (3)
Product Market Tariff .084 -1.446 -3.160
(.170) (.709) (1.345)
Intm. Input Tariff -1.031 1.590 2.406
(.239) (1.104) (2.128)
Exporter Status .044 .045 .078
(.012) (.012) (.021)
Sector-level covariates
FDI Flow (USD billion) .011 .001 .021
(.009) (.010) (.019)
Sector real exch. rate .249 -.046 -1.700
(.288) (.321) (.586)
Herﬁndahl Index (sales) .099 .272 -.026
(.117) (.141) (.256)
Firm aggregates of plant-level covariates
Log Employment -.133 -.134 -.295
(.008) (.008) (.014)
Firm aggregates of worker-level covariates
Pot. labor force experience -.002 -.001 .010
(.001) (.001) (.002)
Prof. or Manag’l. Occ. -.064 -.059 -.030
(.052) (.053) (.094)
Tech’l. or Superv. Occ. .015 .022 -.008
(.043) (.044) (.078)
Unskilled Wh. Collar Occ. -.024 -.022 .052
(.048) (.048) (.087)
Skilled Bl. Collar Occ. .031 .030 .080
(.025) (.025) (.045)
Firm effects yes yes yes
Year effects yes yes yes
Observations 23,268 23,251 25,574
Sources: PIA 1990-98 ﬁrm sample linked to RAIS 1990-98 ﬁrm sample (based on 10-percent random worker sample).
Note: Additional regressors (not reported) as in Table 4. Sector information at subsector IBGE level 1990-93 and
CNAE 4-digit level 1994-98. Instruments for the three endogenous variables Product-market tariffs, Intermediate input
tariffs and Export Status are PPI in Europe, PPI in North America, non-Brazilian imports to Asia-Paciﬁc, Central and
Eastern European, North American, Other Industrialized and Western European countries (at subsector IBGE level
1990-98). Robust standard errors in parentheses:  signiﬁcance at ten,  ﬁve,  one percent.
24outcome σit = σ, is speciﬁed as















where zS(i)t is a vector of sector-level covariates of the individual’s initial sector S(i), including
a sector-ﬁxed effect; xit is a vector of covariates that are job and worker speciﬁc; β&
x and β&
z are




c(i)t are year and regional effects.
Coefﬁcients are identiﬁed relative to a baseline outcome at t+1. For sector reallocation regres-
sions, we use continuous employment with no reported separation (no transition) as the baseline
outcome. For work status regressions, we use as the baseline work status a household member’s
continuation in the present work status, σi;t+1 = σit = σ (at the same or a different employer).
The employer-employee speciﬁc errors of outcomes are assumed to be doubly exponentially dis-
tributed and independent across employer-employee matches. We ﬁt model (2) with maximum
likelihood and restrict the estimation sample to manufacturing jobs at t, for which trade-related
covariates zS(i)t are well deﬁned, but do not impose a sector restriction on job observations at t+1.
We compute Huber-White robust standard errors.
Trade-related sector transitions. We deﬁne the set of possible future sectors of employment
for a worker with a formal manufacturing job: (1) the worker retains the present formal job with
no reported separation from year to year (the baseline category of no employer transition); (2) the
worker moves to another employer within the same subsector IBGE; (3) the worker moves to an
employer in another manufacturing subsector IBGE; (4) the worker moves to an employer outside
manufacturing (including services but also agriculture and mining); or (5) the worker fails to have
formal employment in the following calender year.
Table 8 shows the results from a single estimation of equation (2), with estimates for outcomes
(2)through(5)reportedincolumns1through4. Alowerproduct-markettariffintheworker’sman-
ufacturing sector at t makes a reallocation to another job more likely across all future outcomes,
relative to the baseline category of retained employment. As in the separation and accession re-
gressions before, the intermediate-input tariff consistently exhibits the reverse signs of the product
tariff, either because lower input costs alleviate competition or because they lead to more efﬁcient
production and gains in product market shares. A product tariff reduction raises most the relative
25Table 8: MULTINOMIAL LOGIT ESTIMATION: REALLOCATION
Manufacturing
Transition to: Same sector Other sector Non-manufacturing Failure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Product Market Tariff -1.653 -3.065 -.478 -.587
(.050) (.060) (.043) (.042)
Intm. Input Tariff 2.348 5.458 .586 1.333
(.070) (.085) (.062) (.060)
Exporter Status -.014 .105 .010 .016
(.002) (.003) (.002) (.002)
Sector-level covariates
FDI Flow (USD billion) -.048 -.033 -.051 -.030
(.003) (.004) (.003) (.002)
Herﬁndahl Index (sales) -1.606 1.234 -.225 .031
(.079) (.086) (.063) (.063)
Plant-level covariates
Log Employment -.196 -.113 -.135 -.126
(.0007) (.0008) (.0006) (.0006)
Share: White-collar occ. .305 .167 .650 .288
(.006) (.008) (.005) (.005)
Worker-level covariates
Prof. or Manag’l. Occ. -.271 -.540 -.469 -.220
(.006) (.007) (.005) (.004)
Tech’l. or Superv. Occ. -.432 -.524 -.265 -.311
(.005) (.006) (.003) (.004)
Unskilled Wh. Collar Occ. -.701 -.475 -.129 -.384
(.005) (.006) (.003) (.004)
Skilled Bl. Collar Occ. .151 -.033 -.255 -.172





Sources: RAIS 1990-98 (10-percent random sample), workers nationwide of any gender or age, separated from or
remaining in manufacturing job; SECEX 1990-98; and complementary sector data.
Note: Baseline category is no transition (continuous employment with no reported separation in a given year). Multi-
nomial logit estimates of employment transitions. Separations exclude transfers, deaths, and retirements; accessions
exclude transfers. Additional regressors (not reported): worker and plant-level workforce education. Sector informa-
tion at subsector IBGE level. Robust standard errors in parentheses:  signiﬁcance at ten,  ﬁve,  one percent.
26odds that the worker moves to employment in another manufacturing sector, but an import tariff re-
duction simultaneously diminishes most the relative odds of a transition to another manufacturing
sector. The resulting small net effect is consistent with our descriptive evidence that most realloca-
tions occur within industries. Exporter workers are less likely to switch employer within the same
industry than they are to retain their present job, but exporter workers are more likely to move to
employment in another industry or to drop out of the formal sector. This evidence is consistent
with our prior ﬁnding that exporters displace more workers than nonexporters during the sample
period.
Work status transitions. PME household data allow us to discern work-status transitions out
of formal employment. We estimate a multinomial logit model of a single work status transition
for every PME household member at the annual horizon.22 The set of work status outcomes for
a worker with a formal manufacturing job contains ﬁve alternatives: (1) the worker retains the
formal manufacturing job or switches to a new formal job (not necessarily in manufacturing, the
baseline category); (2) the worker moves to an informal job (not necessarily in manufacturing);
(3) the worker moves to self-employment; (4) the worker moves to unemployment; and (5) the
worker withdraws from the labor force. As a proxy for the worker-ﬁxed effect, we include among
the job-worker covariates an indicator whether the household member had formal work during
the preceding four months. The employer is not identiﬁed in household data, so export status is
unknown to us.
Table 9 presents the results. Lower product-market tariffs are associated with signiﬁcantly
higher odds of transitions into unemployment and out of the labor force, resulting in signiﬁcantly
more transitions out of formality. Intermediate-input tariffs show converse signs as expected.
Workers with stable formal-sector employment for four months are signiﬁcantly less likely to lose
formality status over the following year. Higher educational attainment, from some high-school
attainment through college education, predicts signiﬁcantly fewer transitions into informality, self-
employment and unemployment. Education groups with less than a college degree are more likely
to transition out of the labor force.
22We choose a multinomial over an ordered logit model because, conditional on a set of individual job and worker
characteristics, work status types such as informal or self-employment have no intrinsic ordering.
27Table 9: WORK STATUS TRANSITIONS FROM FORMAL EMPLOYMENT
From formal manufacturing employment in t to:
(in t+1) Informal Self employed Unemployed Withdrawn
Covariate (in t) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Product Market Tariff .646 .319 -2.035 -1.929
(.870) (.474) (.788) (.721)
Intm. Input Tariff -1.417 .835 2.403 2.761
(1.056) (.632) (.707) (.796)
Formal empl. for four months -1.299 -1.190 -.610 -.882
(.040) (.067) (.077) (.035)
Age -.100 .152 -.027 -.171
(.013) (.018) (.015) (.015)
Sqrd. age .001 -.002 -.0001 .003
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002)
Indic.: Male .263 .578 .098 -1.115
(.064) (.106) (.080) (.055)
Some High School -.065 -.195 .025 .008
(.064) (.071) (.051) (.081)
Some College -.199 -.432 -.064 -.342
(.080) (.089) (.081) (.080)
College Degree -.292 -.500 -.361 -.521
(.081) (.088) (.128) (.096)
Year effects yes
Sector effects yes
Metro area effects yes
Obs. 48,353
Pseudo R2 .066
Source: PME 1986-99, household members of any gender and age in metropolitan area, with initial formal manufac-
turing employment (annual transitions between 4th and 8th interview).
Note: Baseline category is continuation in formal work status. Sector-level variables at level similar to atividade-80
classiﬁcation. Further regressors (not reported): Sector real exchange rate, FDI ﬂow, Herﬁndahl index. Standard errors
in parentheses (clustering at sector level):  signiﬁcance at ten,  ﬁve,  one percent.
In related research, Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) detect no signiﬁcant effect of trade liberal-
ization on the incidence of informality in sector data for Brazil. Our estimates for trade-related
informality transitions also lack statistical signiﬁcance after inclusion of sector-ﬁxed effects. The
evidence from PME is nevertheless consistent with the hypothesis that falling product tariffs are
associated with signiﬁcantly more transitions out of formality and into unemployment.
In conclusion, our estimates of reallocations from RAIS and PME data suggest that transitions
out of formality and into nonemployment are trade related. To assess the quantitative importance
of trade for idle resources, we conduct counterfactual simulations of alternative trade policies.
285 Counterfactual Simulations
We characterize nonemployment in the reallocation process with two main measures: the rate
of failed reallocations and the duration of complete reallocations, as reported in the introductory
Figure 1 and in Table 1. These measures of idle labor are driven by separations and accessions
under a canonical law of motion.
Law of motion. In worker panel and linked employer-employee data like ours, there are two
chief states of work status for a worker in period t: formal employment et and nonemployment
nt (including informal employment, self-employment, unemployment, and withdrawal from the
labor force). Denote the gross worker ﬂow from employment into nonemployment with ent, and
the converse gross worker ﬂow from nonemployment into employment with net. A canonical law
of motion describes this labor market:
nt+1   nt = St et   Ft nt =  (et+1   et), (3)
where St  ent/et is the separation rate from employment and Ft  net/nt is the job ﬁnding
rate out of nonemployment. This law of motion is the discrete time version of nonemployment
evolution in Pissarides (2000, ch. 1.1), similar to Mortensen (1994). Instead of the job ﬁnding rate
Ft, in RAIS we observe the accession rate into employment At  net/et = (nt/et)Ft. We rewrite
the law of motion in terms of the accession rate:
nt+1   nt = (St   At)et. (4)
As a result, the nonemployment pool (the pool of workers to be reallocated) evolves with
nt+1 = St et + (1   Ft)nt.
Two important measures characterize the reallocation process. First, there is the failure rate of





Second, for the complementary group of workers with complete reallocations within T periods
there is the average duration that an individual entering nonemployment at t takes to ﬁnd the ﬁrst
29new formal job (duration of complete reallocations). To compute that duration, ﬁrst observe that















Both statistics (5) and (6) only depend on Ft = (et/nt)At. However, (et/nt) depends on separa-
tions St, so Ft does depend on both St and At.
Simulation. Using our estimates of separation and accession rates St and At, we can infer the
counterfactual separations and accessions that would have occurred had tariffs followed a different
time path.23
Denote the counterfactual accession and separation rates with ^ At and ^ St. We predict ^ At =
At + βA
 (^ τcntrfct
t  τt) and ^ St = St + βS
 (^ τcntrfct
t  τt) from the estimated effects, where ^ τcntrfct
t is the
counterfactual product tariff level and βA
 and βS
 are the coefﬁcient estimates on product-market
tariffs form our benchmark speciﬁcation using the full RAIS random sample (Table 4, columns 2
and 5). We do not use intermediate-input tariffs for simulation because their coefﬁcients are statis-
tically not signiﬁcant in the benchmark speciﬁcations.
We ﬁrst compute the job ﬁnding rates Fs that are consistent with the observed reallocation
failure rates ϕt;t+T (Figure 1), anchoring inference at the end of the sample period in 1997-2001.
From the data, we recursively back out actual Ft = 1   ϕt;t+T/[(1   Ft+1)(1   Ft+T)] for all
years prior to 1997. Then we simulate the counterfactual job-ﬁnding rate with






where we adjust the nonemployment-to-employment ratio from PNAD household data by year-
over-year changes to numerator and denominator under the law of motion. The counterfactual
accession rate ^ As enters into ^ Fs both directly and through the counterfactual nonemployment-to-
23Lacking monthly variation in industry-level variables and ﬁrm export status, our choice of period for estimation
in Section 3 has been the calendar year. The regression sample data relate the ﬁrst separation (per worker and year) to
ﬁnal employment, and they relate the last accession (per worker and year) to ﬁrst employment.
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86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97
Calendar year
Counterfct. Prd. Mkt. Tariff Prd. Mkt. Trf.
Counterfct. Realloc. Durations Realloc. Durations
Sources: RAIS 1986-2001 (10-percent random sample for estimates), workers nationwide of any gender or age, sepa-
rated from a formal-sector job; not re-acceding into a formal-sector job within 48 months (left graphs) or re-acceding
into a formal-sector job within 48 months (right graphs). PNAD 1988-1998, household members nationwide age 25
through 64, with or without formal-sector job. Product tariffs from Kume et al. (2003), employment weighted at N´ ıvel
50 sector level in 1988.
Note: Simulated job-ﬁnding rates ˆ Fs = ˆ As/(\ ns/es) from ˆ At = At + βA
τ (ˆ τcntrfct
t  τt) and \ ns/es from ratio of
ˆ ns = (ˆ Ss 1   ˆ As 1)es 1 + ns 1 and ˆ es = ( ˆ As 1   ˆ Ss 1)es 1 + es 1 given simulated relative changes to
PNAD nonemployment and employment counts. Simulated ﬁnding rate ˆ Fs then used in the reallocation failure rate
ˆ ϕt,t+T 
∏t+T




s=t(1  ˆ Fs) ˆ Fp/(1   ˆ ϕt,T).
Figure 2: Counterfactual tariffs and simulated labor-market performance
31employment ratio, whereas the counterfactual separation rate ^ St only enters through the nonem-
ployment-to-employment ratio. We feed the counterfactual ^ Fs into (5) and (6) (for additional de-
tails see Appendix F), and simulate the reallocation failure rate ^ ϕt;t+T and the average reallocation
duration ^ dt;t+T.
Scenarios. We consider two politically realistic counterfactual scenarios for tariffs over the pe-
riod 1991-1996. First, we ponder a piecemeal tariff reduction that is spread over more than one
election cycle, slower than the actual reform and without the observed tariff reversal after the mid
1990s. This piecemeal tariff path is depicted in the upper panel of Figure 2. Second, we conceive
a radical immediate tariff drop in 1991 to the 1997 level, but without the tariff undershooting be-
fore the reversal in the mid 1990s. This shock-therapy tariff path is depicted in the lower panel of
Figure 2.
The simulation shows for the piecemeal scenario that the rate of failed reallocations would
have been considerably lower, remaining roughly at its 1990 level, until it increases in the late
1990s for reasons apparently unrelated to trade reform. Durations of complete reallocations would
have temporarily gotten longer, peaking in the early 1990s, but dropped back to their initial 1990
levels by the mid 1990s, until durations also rise in the late 1990s for reasons apparently unrelated
to trade reform.24 The simulation result suggests that phasing tariffs down at a slower pace than
withintheﬁrstthreeyearsofthefederalﬁve-yearelectioncyclewouldhaveconsiderablyalleviated
the adjustment burden on the Brazilian labor market.
A simulated shock therapy raises the rate of failed reallocations and extends the durations of
complete reallocations in the early 1990s. By the mid 1990s, however, the simulated labor-market
effects from shock therapy are hardly distinguishable from actual reallocation failures and dura-
tions. Under the shock therapy scenario, reallocation failures and durations worsen less than they
seem to improve under the piecemeal scenario. The labor-market effects of Brazil’s trade reform
therefore appear to be closer to those of a shock therapy scenario than piecemeal reform. Simula-
tion results for both scenarios support the hypothesis that trade reform contributes signiﬁcantly to
24The simulation shows a faster increase in average reallocation durations prior to 1990 because a relatively smaller
mass of workers will exhibit long reallocations in the early 1990s so that the weighted average reallocation duration
mechanically rises prior to 1990 by equation (6).
32Brazil’s labor-market outcomes during the early 1990s.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper contrasts the common ﬁnding that output shares are reallocated to more productive
ﬁrms after trade reform with direct evidence on individual worker trajectories in the labor mar-
ket. Comprehensive linked employer-employee data for Brazil reveal that product tariff reductions
induce displacements especially from exporters and employers in comparative-advantage sectors,
and product tariff cuts substantively depress hiring rates. The ensuring slow reallocation process
results in substantial idle resources, which we observe through more frequently failing realloca-
tions and longer durations of complete reallocations. A consistent explanation of these observed
economic changes is that trade reform instills productivity growth at surviving ﬁrms, especially at
exporters. Their product-market shares expand but their employment shares shrink under below-
unity elasticities of demand.
Gains from trade accrue even in the absence of factor reallocation, through access to more
varieties at global prices. Some of these gains dissipate, however, through adjustment costs from
resulting idle resources for extended periods of time. In Brazil, more frequent failures of worker
reallocations in the formal sector and more frequent transitions out of formality after trade reform
substantively contribute to the slowdown in aggregate economic activity. Much research studies
trade-related earnings inequality, conditional on employment. Our ﬁndings caution that earnings
inequality also responds to trade-related spells of unemployment, self employment and informality,
which are typically associated with foregone earnings. Brazil’s evidence suggests that the labor-
market response to trade reform depends on several concomitant factors, among them the strength
of ﬁrm-level productivity change in response to foreign competition and access to foreign inputs,
demand elasticities in the product market, and labor-market institutions. Their interactions cross
the boundaries of multiple ﬁelds of economics but promise to illuminate important consequences
of trade for welfare and earnings inequality.
33Appendix
A Linked employer-employee data
Brazilian law requires every Brazilian plant to submit detailed annual reports with individual infor-
mation on its workers and employees to the ministry of labor (Minist´ erio de Trabalho, MTE). The
collection of the reports is called Relac ¸˜ ao Anual de Informac ¸˜ oes Sociais, or RAIS, and typically
concluded at the parent ﬁrm by late February or early March for the preceding year of observation.
RAIS primarily provides information to a federal wage supplement program (Abono Salarial), by
which every worker with formal employment during the calendar year receives the equivalent of
a monthly minimum wage. RAIS records are then shared across government agencies. An em-
ployer’s failure to report complete workforce information can result in ﬁnes proportional to the
workforce size; but ﬁnes are seldom issued. A strong incentive for compliance is that the worker’s
annual public wage supplement is exclusively based on RAIS so that workers follow up on their
records, whereas employer contributions are not based on RAIS. The ministry of labor estimates
that currently 97 percent of all formally employed workers in Brazil are covered in RAIS, and that
coverage exceeded 90 percent throughout the 1990s.
RAIS includes workers formally employed in any sector (including the public sector). Our full
data have 71.1 million workers with 556.3 million job spells at 5.52 million plants in 3.75 million
ﬁrms between 1986 and 2001. Overall, formal-sector employment increases from 23.2 million
to 24.5 million between 1990 and 1998 in RAIS. We infer a plant’s workforce composition by
aggregating RAIS to the plant level.
Incentives for dismissal. By Brazilian law, the employer is required to make monthly contri-
butions to a severance pay account for every worker (Fundo de Garantia por Tempo de Servic ¸o
or FGTS, managed by the Brazilian state bank Caixa Econˆ omica Federal). Contributions to this
account are akin to mandatory worker savings for precaution against possible future separation.
During the 1990s, monthly contributions amount to a fraction α = .08 of the worker’s monthly
wage. In the case of an unjustiﬁed dismissal (sem justa causa), the employer must make a sever-
ance pay that amounts to a fraction β = .40 of the then accumulated FGTS balance. The worker
34can withdraw from the FGTS savings only if the worker suffers an employer-initiated dismissal
(not if there is a worker-initiated quit), or can withdraw for a bank-sanctioned investment into do-
mestic real estate, sanitation or infrastructure. See Heckman and Pag´ es (2004) and Gonzaga (2003)
for further details.
Denote a worker’s monthly earnings with w(t). Then the accumulated severance pay account
balance of a worker with tenure T is
∑T
t=0 αw(t). If a dismissal occurs at time T, then the
employer’s severance costs are β
∑T
t=0 αw(t). So the incremental severance cost for an additional
period of employment from T until T+1 is β αw(T+1). This incremental severance cost strictly
increases over time if and only if the wage increases with tenure. For the employer can reset the
wage to a lower level upon dismissal and re-hiring, the Brazilian severance pay mandate creates an
incentive for spurious dismissals with subsequent re-hiring.
Observation screening. In RAIS, workers are identiﬁed by an individual-speciﬁc PIS (Programa
de Integrac ¸˜ ao Social) number that is similar to a social security number in the United States (but
the PIS number is not used for identiﬁcation purposes other than the administration of the wage
supplement program Abono Salarial). A given plant may report the same PIS number multiple
times within a single year in order to help the worker withdraw deposits from the worker’s sev-
erance pay savings account (Fundo de Garantia do Tempo de Servic ¸o, FGTS) through spurious
layoffs and rehires. Bad compliance may cause certain PIS numbers to be recorded incorrectly
or repeatedly. To handle these issues, we screen RAIS in two steps. (1) Observations with PIS
numbers shorter than 11 digits are removed. These may correspond to informal (undocumented)
workers or measurement error from faulty bookkeeping. (2) For several separation statistics, we
remove multiple jobs from the sample if a worker’s duplicate jobs have identical accession and sep-
aration dates at the same plant. For a worker with such multiple employments, we only keep the
observation with the highest average monthly wage level (in cases of wage ties, we drop duplicate
observations randomly).
Experience, education and occupation categories. During the period 1986-93, RAIS reports
a worker’s age in terms of eight age ranges. For consistency, we categorize the age in years into
thoseeightagerangesalsofor1994-2001. Weconstructaproxyforpotentialworkforceexperience
35from the nine education categories and the mean age within a worker’s age range. For example, a
typical Early Career worker (34.5 years of age) who is also a Middle School Dropout (left school
at 11 years of age) is assigned 23.5 years of potential workforce experience. We adopt the same
conventions as Menezes-Filho et al. (2008) when we infer the “typical” age of a worker in the
reported age ranges, when we regroup the nine RAIS education categories into four categories, and
when we reclassify the 3-digit CBO occupation indicators into single-digit ISCO-88 categories.
B Manufacturing ﬁrm data
We use productivity measures from Brazil’s annual manufacturing ﬁrm survey PIA (Pesquisa In-
dustrial Anual) for 1986-98. PIA is a representative sample of all but the smallest manufacturing
ﬁrms, collected by Brazil’s statistical bureau IBGE. We ﬁrst obtain log TFP measures from Ol-
ley and Pakes (1996) estimation at the N´ ıvel 50 sector level under a Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation
(Muendler 2004). We then convert log TFP to log labor productivity by adding the production-
coefﬁcient weighted effects of capital accumulation and intermediate input use. Labor productivity
is denominated in BRL-deﬂated USD-1994 revenue equivalents per worker.
IBGE’s publication rules allow data from PIA to be withdrawn in the form of tabulations with
at least three ﬁrms per entry. We construct random combinations of three ﬁrms by drawing from
sector-location-year cells. A cell is deﬁned by the ﬁrm’s N´ ıvel 50 sector, headquarters location,
and pattern of observation years. We assign every PIA ﬁrm to one and only one multi-ﬁrm com-
bination. Per cell, one four- or ﬁve-ﬁrm combination is deﬁned when the number of ﬁrms in the
sector-location-year cell is not divisible by three. For each three-to-ﬁve-ﬁrm combination, we cal-
culate mean log productivity but retain the ﬁrm identiﬁers behind the combination—permitting the
linking to RAIS.
C Metropolitan household data
The Brazilian monthly employment survey PME (Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego) is conducted by
Brazil’s statistical bureau IBGE, using a rotating panel similar to the U.S. CPS and the British
36BHPS. PME follows a random sample of households for 16 months in six metropolitan areas (S˜ ao
Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre, Salvador, Recife), with an eight-month in-
terval after the fourth interview.25 Changes to the sample design adversely affect worker panels
starting in odd years. So, we use only individuals whose ﬁrst survey occurs in 1986, 1988, 1990,
1992, 1994, 1996 or 1998.
In the survey, individuals without employment are considered unemployed if they report active
search for work during the week prior to the interview, and are considered out of the workforce
otherwise. Household members who work for their own account but do not employ others are
considered self-employed. We exclude transitions of individuals who become employers.
D Additional sector data
We use data on ad valorem tariffs by sector and year from Kume, Piani and Souza (2003). The
tariffs are the legally stipulated nominal rates for Brazil’s trade partners with no preferential trade
agreement, and not weighted by source country. Wecombine these tariffseries with economy-wide
input-output matrices from IBGE to arrive at intermediate input tariff measures by sector and year.
We calculate the intermediate-input tariff as the weighted arithmetic average of the product-market
tariffs, using sector-speciﬁc shares of inputs for the input-output matrix as weights. Foreign direct
investment (FDI) and annual GDP data are from the Brazilian central bank.
Weconstructsector-speciﬁcrealexchangeratesfromthenominalexchangeratetotheU.S.dol-
lar E, Brazilian wholesale price indices Pi, and average foreign price series for groups of Brazil’s
main trading partners P 
i by sector i, and deﬁne the real exchange rate as qi  EP 
i /Pi so that
a high value means a depreciated real sector exchange rate. We rebase the underlying price se-
ries to a value of 1 in 1995. We use Brazil’s import shares from its major 25 trading partners in
1995 as weights for P 
i . We obtain sector-speciﬁc annual series from producer price indices for
the 12 OECD countries among Brazil’s main 25 trading partners (sector-speciﬁc PPI series from
SourceOECD; U.S. PPI series from Bureau of Labor Statistics). We combine these sector-speciﬁc
price indices with the 13 annual aggregate producer (wholesale if producer unavailable) price in-
25Individuals within households are surveyed for a total of eight interviews over a 16-months period. Denoting the
initial month with m, interviews are at m, m + 1, m + 2, m + 3, m + 12, m + 13, m + 14, and m + 15.
37Table E.1: SUMMARY STATISTICS
5th comp.
All sectors and ﬁrms adv. quintile Exporter
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Mean
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcomes
Indic.: Separation .237 .425 .278 .197
Quit .038 .191 .048 .028
Indic.: Accession .223 .416 .282 .156
Main covariates
Exporter Status .491 .500 .472 1.000
Product Market Tariff .206 .113 .181 .206
Intm. Input Tariff .155 .085 .114 .153
Balassa Comp. Adv. 1990 1.424 1.062 3.189 1.404
Plant-level covariates
Log Employment 5.129 1.970 5.546 6.238
Log Employment 1998/90 .939 .956 .924
Log Labor Productivity 11.202 .752 11.063 11.260
Log Labor Productivity 1998/90 1.051 1.021 1.052
Sources: RAIS 1990-98 (10-percent random sample), workers nationwide of any gender or age, with manufactur-
ing job. Statistics based on separation sample, except for accession indicator (5,338,164 observations in separation,
5,303,710 in accession sample). Sector information at subsector IBGE level. PIA 1986-98 for labor productivity
information.
dex series for Brazil’s remaining major trading partners (from Global Financial Data), for whom
sector-speciﬁc PPI are not available.
E Workforce characteristics and trade exposure
Table E.1 provides a summary comparison of variables for workers in manufacturing industries
withdifferentquintilesofcomparativeadvantage, andbetweenexportersandtheaverageemployer.
Top comparative-advantage industries (in the highest quintile) show a higher labor turnover than
the average sector with both more worker separations and more accessions, whereas exporting
ﬁrms exhibit below-average turnover with both fewer worker separations and fewer accessions
than average.26 Among the separations, reported quits play a minor role.
Exporters employ 49.1 percent of Brazil’s labor force in 1990-98 (but account for only around
26Cu˜ nat and Melitz (2010) develop a Ricardian model in which countries with more ﬂexible labor markets specialize
in more volatile industries. Evidence in Table E.1 suggests that Brazil, a country with relatively rigid labor markets
compared to its main trade partners by World Bank measures (Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez de Silanes and
Shleifer 2004), exhibits more labor volatility in its comparative-advantage industries.
38ﬁve percent of ﬁrms). The share of exporter employment is slightly lower in manufacturing indus-
tries in the top quintile, suggesting that exporters are relatively larger employers in sectors with
below-top comparative advantage. Expectedly for a country with a history of import-substitution
industrialization, Brazil’s top comparative-advantage industries have below average product mar-
ket tariffs. Interestingly, however, workers at exporters face similar tariff levels to workers at the
average employer and, consistent with this pattern, face similar levels of comparative advantage.
Firms in top comparative-advantage industries and exporters have larger workforces than average
(91 and 319 workers more, respectively, than the average formal-sector manufacturing plant with
141 workers). Manufacturing employment drops between 1990 and 1998, and drops faster than
average at exporters.
Labor productivity is higher than average at exporters over the whole sample period, but lower
than average at ﬁrms in comparative-advantage industries. Log labor productivity in 1998 exceeds
log labor productivity in 1990 by roughly 5.1 percent in the estimation sample, and by roughly 5.2
percent at exporters.
F Simulations
We ﬁrst infer the job ﬁnding rates Fs that are consistent with the observed reallocation failure rates
ϕt;t+T in Figure 1 at the four-year horizon. For this purpose, we anchor inference at the end of
the sample period and assume that the economy reaches its four-year average job ﬁnding rate in
the period 1997-2000 so that, using (5), F1997 = 1   (ϕ1997;2000)1=4 = F1998 = ... = F2000. This
is a relatively mild assumption because we restrict our counterfactual differences in tariffs to the
period 1991-1996 and do not use later years for counterfactual comparisons. We recursively infer
Ft = 1   ϕt;t+T/[(1   Ft+1)(1   Ft+T)] for all years prior to 1997.
We simulate the counterfactual job-ﬁnding rate ^ Fs as described in the text. To simulate the re-
allocation failure rate ^ ϕt;t+T we use ^ Fs in (5). The left-hand side graphs in Figure 2 show simulated
reallocation failures. To simulate the average reallocation duration ^ dt;t+T, we face a short-coming
of the canonical law of motion (3). The job ﬁnding rates Fs that are consistent with the observed re-
allocation failure rates ϕt;t+T in Figure 1 at the four-year horizon are inconsistent with the observed
39reallocation durations. The failure-inferred job ﬁnding rates imply more than one-third longer re-
allocation durations than are actually observed. A likely reason is unaccounted heterogeneity of
high-turnover and low-turnover workers, with a larger mass of rapidly reallocated nonemployed
workers at shorter horizons than a constant job-ﬁnding rate implies. So for our simulated average
reallocation duration ^ dt;t+T, we use the observed annual adjustment factors that translate the dura-
tions from failure-implied ﬁnding rates into accordingly shorter usually observed durations. The
right-hand side graphs in Figure 2 show simulated reallocation durations.
G Additional Regressions
We report in this appendix in Table G.1 the ﬁrst-stage results that underly the IV regressions in
columns 3 and 6 of Table 4. We report additional robustness results in Tables G.2 and G.3.
Ownership of a plant is observable in RAIS since 1995, when privatization of state-owned
services ﬁrms began. We impute a plant’s ownership status in 1990-94 as the ownership status in
1995 and include the private-ownership indicator at the plant-level in regression (1). As columns 1
and 4 show, coefﬁcient estimates on the trade-related variables exhibit no statistically signiﬁcant
change, and the ownership-status itself is not a statistically signiﬁcant predictor of separations.
Accessions are signiﬁcantly lower in sectors with many private ﬁrms. We infer the susceptibility
of a job to outsourcing (tercerizac ¸˜ ao) if it is a service occupation at the CBO three-digit level
that can be performed in-house or be provided by a specialized subcontractor. Jobs susceptible
to outsourcing exhibit statistically signiﬁcantly more separations and fewer accessions, but there
are no statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcient changes in trade variables. Conditional logit estimates,
reported in columns 3 and 6 of Table G.2, corroborate our linear model estimates.
40Table G.1: FIRST-STAGE PREDICTIONS
Separations Accessions
Sample RAIS RAIS RAIS RAIS RAIS RAIS
Dependent variable Prd. Mkt. Intm. Inp. Exp. Prd. Mkt. Intm. Inp. Exp.
Tariff Tariff Status Tariff Tariff Status
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Instruments
World imports APD -28.577 -50.974 .458 -28.002 -50.841 1.412
(.211) (.130) (1.501) (.211) (.130) (1.514)
World imports CEE -488.715 -326.813 -60.492 -488.616 -326.072 -63.142
(.542) (.333) (3.850) (.542) (.333) (3.880)
World imports NAM -59.363 -9.996 35.198 -58.448 -10.016 40.100
(.179) (.110) (1.270) (.179) (.110) (1.282)
World imports OIN 94.904 113.853 68.189 94.310 114.633 65.991
(.340) (.209) (2.416) (.341) (.210) (2.443)
World imports WEU -100.136 -88.568 39.455 -100.563 -88.352 39.466
(.243) (.149) (1.728) (.244) (.150) (1.746)
PPI Idx. EU, import-weight 95 -.429 -.171 -.185 -.438 -.169 -.209
(.002) (.001) (.016) (.002) (.001) (.016)
PPI Idx. NAM, import-weight 95 .494 .043 -.204 .498 .049 -.216
(.002) (.001) (.016) (.002) (.001) (.016)
Exogenous covariates
FDI Flow (USD billion) .001 .0001 -.005 .001 .0002 -.005
(.00006) (.00004) (.0004) (.00006) (.00004) (.0005)
Herﬁndahl Index (sales) -.027 -.059 .007 -.028 -.060 .014
(.0005) (.0003) (.003) (.0005) (.0003) (.003)
Log Employment .0008 -.00008 .110 .0008 -.00008 .105
(.00002) (.00002) (.0002) (.00002) (1.00e-05) (.0002)
Share: Some High School -.0003 -.0007 .073 1.73e-06 -.0007 .074
(.0002) (.0001) (.001) (.0002) (.0001) (.001)
Share: Some College .001 -.006 .214 .0006 -.006 .228
(.0003) (.0002) (.002) (.0003) (.0002) (.002)
Share: White-collar occ. .0002 .002 .148 -.0005 .002 .152
(.0002) (.0001) (.001) (.0002) (.0001) (.001)
Worker effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sector effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 5,326,737 5,326,737 5,326,737 5,292,404 5,292,404 5,292,404
R2 (within) .823 .883 .123 .824 .883 .120
F statistic (joint IVs) 79477.27 13104.83 102.66 81178.72 13114.04 119.581
Sources: WTF (NBER) bilateral import data 1990-98 at subsector IBGE level; sector data from various sources at subsector IBGE level 1990-93 and
CNAE 4-digit level 1994-98; RAIS 1990-98 labor force information; SECEX exporter information 1990-98.
Note: First-stage estimates for column 3 and 6 in Table 4 weighted by worker-sample observations. Imports to foreign destinations are annual
sector-weighted shipments from source countries other than Brazil, coefﬁcients rescaled to imports in USD trillion. Additional regressors (not
reported) as in Table 4. Robust standard errors in parentheses:  signiﬁcance at ten,  ﬁve,  one percent.
41Table G.2: SEPARATIONS AND ACCESSIONS: ROBUSTNESS
Separations Accessions
Sample RAIS-PIA RAIS-PIA RAIS-PIA RAIS-PIA RAIS-PIA RAIS-PIA
Estimator FE FE cLogit FE FE cLogit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Product Market Tariff -.264 -.183 -1.161 .244 .235 1.776
(.119) (.097) (.095) (.141) (.119) (.104)
Intm. Input Tariff .415 .289 2.556 -.420 -.420 -3.307
(.317) (.288) (.149) (.369) (.349) (.155)
Exporter Status .037 .037 .234 -.046 -.048 -.358
(.003) (.003) (.006) (.002) (.002) (.006)
Share: Jobs at private ﬁrms -.014 -.086
(.047) (.034)
Indic.: Outsourceable job .006 -.016
(.002) (.002)
Worker effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sector effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 4,747,727 5,281,036 2,846,694 4,725,103 5,248,748 2,576,206
(Pseudo) R2 .056 .056 .145 .033 .033 .076
Sources: RAIS 1990-98 (10-percent random sample), workers nationwide of any gender or age, separated from or
acceding into manufacturing job; PIA 1990-98 random three-ﬁrm aggregates; SECEX 1990-98; and complementary
sector data.
Note: Separations exclude transfers, deaths, and retirements; accessions exclude transfers. Reference observations
are employments with no reported separation or accession in a given year. Additional regressors (not reported) as
in Table 4. Sector information at subsector IBGE level 1990-93 and CNAE 4-digit level 1994-98. Standard errors in
parentheses (two-way clustering at worker and sector level following Cameron et al. 2011):  signiﬁcance at ten, 
ﬁve,  one percent.
42Table G.3: SEPARATIONS AND ACCESSIONS: WORKER INTERACTIONS
Separations Accessions
Sample RAIS RAIS RAIS RAIS RAIS RAIS
Estimator FE FE FE FE FE FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Product Market Tariff -.178 -.173 -.173 .252 .232 .256
(.106) (.094) (.096) (.133) (.099) (.122)
Intm. Input Tariff .296 .288 .304 -.454 -.507 -.448
(.297) (.284) (.288) (.362) (.332) (.350)
Exporter Status .037 .037 .037 -.048 -.047 -.048
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Prd. Trff.High-sch. or coll. ed. -.034 -.021
(.034) (.041)
Intm. Trff.High-sch. or coll. ed. -.029 .118
(.045) (.051)
Prd. Trff.Young -.100 .142
(.060) (.200)
Intm. Trff.Young .096 .162
(.073) (.250)
Prd. Trff.White collar -.058 -.052
(.043) (.040)
Intm. Trff.White collar -.082 .072
(.060) (.063)
Worker effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sector effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 5,338,164 5,338,164 5,338,164 5,303,710 5,303,710 5,303,710
R2 .056 .056 .056 .033 .035 .033
Sources: RAIS 1990-98 (10-percent random sample), workers nationwide of any gender or age, separated from or
acceding into manufacturing job; PIA 1990-98 random three-ﬁrm aggregates; SECEX 1990-98; and complementary
sector data.
Note: Separations exclude transfers, deaths, and retirements; accessions exclude transfers. Young workers have ten or
less years of potential labor force experience, high-school or college-educated workers have some high-school educa-
tion. Reference observations are employments with no reported separation or accession in a given year. Additional
regressors (not reported) as in Table 4. Sector information at subsector IBGE level 1990-93 and CNAE 4-digit level
1994-98. Standard errors in parentheses (two-way clustering at worker and sector level following Cameron et al.
2011):  signiﬁcance at ten,  ﬁve,  one percent.
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